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Abstract
Many different types of pension plans exist in American firms. The
stipulations of plans vary dramatically, even among large firms, withrespect
to vesting, relationship of the pension to final salary, maximum and minimum
years of service constraints, and maximum and minimum benefit levels. These
provisions are examined to determine their effects on worker behavior.Spe-
cifically, the paper analyes which plans encourage or discourage appropriate
worker responses in hours worked, turnover, human capital investment and
effort. An attempt is made to explain the provisions in light of the
findings.
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(312) 962—7464Private pensions have experienced rapid growth during thepast 30 years.
A.lthough there are elements of pensions that many plans share, there are also
a large number of differences across plans. The most obvious differences
relate to the basic structure of the pension benefit formula: theplan may be
of the defined contribution or of the defined benefit type. In the latter
cateqory the flat or pattern plan can be distinguished from the formula or
conventonal plan.
Economists often refer casually to the effects that changes in the bene-
fit formulas have on worker behavior. Most frequently, these comments relate
to the effects of vesting on worker turnover. But as far as I am aware, no
systematic attempt has been made to analyze the ways in which various pro-
visions of the pension benefit formulas influence worker behavior.1 This
essay attempts to do just that. Specifically, it examines the effects of
pension benefit provisions on worker turnover, labor supply, investment in
human capital, and worker effort. Existing benefit formulas arecompared with
formulas that produce first best results and an attempt is made to determine
if and understand why provisions may deviate from those that produce efficient
outcomes. In so doing, it is hoped that the understanding of the existence of
private pensions will be furthered.
The paper examines a number of different pension institutions. It
analyzes how worker productivity (as affected by turnover, investment in human
capital and effort) is influenced by a change from defined benefit to defined
contribution plans and why pattern plans and conventional plans inducevery
different behavior. It also examines the effects of minimum and maximumyears
of service requirements, industry—wide vs. company—wide plans, the relation-
ship between hours—of—work constraints and pensions, why pensions are often
related to final salary, as well as a number of other issues. For most of the—2—
analysis, the pension rule is taken to be exogenous so that the incentive
effects of that rule per se can be described. This is a less ambitious task
than understanding why those rules exist and what other factors are involved.
Occasionally some conjectures on the reasons for particular rules are
presented, but that is not the primary purpose of the essay. The most
important findings are:
Pension benefit formulas cannot affect worker behavior or cause deviations
from efficiency if each worker's wage is directly and appropriately
related to his own pension level. Without explicit offsets, the following
results obtain:
•Defined benefit pattern plans induce an efficient allocation of
resources.
•Defined benefit conventional plans induce too little turnover, too
much work, too much effort and too much human capital investment
relative to the efficient outcome.
•Defined contribution plans always induce an efficient allocation of
resources.
•Complete and immediate vesting is a necessary condition for fully
efficient pension plans. Incomplete vesting• tends to result in too
little work by some, and too much by others. The standard intuition
that pensions create longer job tenure on average is not necessarily
correct. The apparent inefficiency, but widespread existence, of
imperfectly vested pension plans suggests that the sorting or
retention of workers may be an important problem.
•Minimum yearsof service constraints create inefficiency in pattern
plans, whereas such constraints may actually reduce the inefficiency
of conventional plans. Further, maximum years of service constraints—3—
tend to offset the inefficiency introduced by minimumyears of service
constraints.
0Theinefficiencies introduced by defined benefit conventional plans
can be undone by specifying required effort levels. Thus, piece rate
workers, who choose their own effort levels, should not have defined
benefit conventional plans.
A Model
The essence of the relationship between benefit formulas and worker
behavior can be analyzed in the context of a one—period model. Workers are
paid some wage, W, and are entitled to a pension, P, which may depend upon
years of service, salary, and a number of other rules having to do with mini-
mum and maximum age and years of service. In this one—period context, "years
of service" is thought of simplyasthe number of years or hours, H, worked
during the period so that a benefit formula that depends upon years of service
is one that has H as an argument.
Workers can control two variables: The amount of time worked, H,is the
labor supply variable and is affected by the worker's alternative use of time
function, L(H). This reflects either the value of leisure or the wage on an
alternative job, whichever is highest. In this way, we can analyze worker
turnover in this simple framework since there need be no formal distinction
between retirement and quitting to take another job (although the pension flow
may differ depending upon what the worker does with his time).
Both effort and investment in human capital are captured by the worker's
control over K, which affects worker productivity and potentially thewage.
No distinction is made in this model between effort and human capital,
although some differences may be relevant.2 There is some cost associated—4—
with increasing K, given by the total cost function C(K). This carries
either the interpretation of costs of investment in human capital, in the form
of formal schooling or on—the—job training which occurs before the current
period, or the disutility value associated with additional effort.
The reason that H and K must be distinguished is that effort or
investment in human capital affects pensions in a different way from years of
service. All defined benefit plans depend upon years of service, but only
some depend upon salary as well. Effort and human capital investment are
likely to affect salary directly, but years of service only indirectly.
The approach does not build in any explicit reason for the existence of
pensions, although a number have been given in the literature.3 Instead, the
reverse strategy is adopted. The effects of various provisions are analyzed
in hope of obtaining clues to the reasons for their existence.
Given the two choice variables, it is trivial to write down the
efficiency conditions for labor supply, H, and effort or human capital, K.
The value of K in increasing output is normalized to be $1 and the worker's
productivity at K =0is V per unit of time. Thus, the workerts output is
(V +K)Hand the efficiency criterion is derived by maximization of social
benefit minus social cost or, under separability, by
(1) Max (V +K)H—C(K)—L(H)
H,K




Whether the worker behaves in a way so as to insure efficiency depends
upon his own utility maximization. Additionally, since firms wish to maximize
profits, it is necessary to look to the interaction between the two in order
to derive implications for changes in the pension plan.
For generality, allow that the worker's choice of K and H can affect
both W and P. Then the worker's problem is
(2) Max W(K, H)H +P(K,H) -C(K)-L(H)
H,K
which yields as first—order conditions,
(2i) /K =(aW/aK)H+P/K—C'(K)=0
(2ii) a/aH =(3W/H)H+W+aP/aH—L'(H)=o
Whatmakes the issue less than straightforward is the fact that payments
that takes the form of a pension must be offset by a decrease in thewage




Equation (3) says that total payments to the worker must equal total output by
the worker.
Important is the way in which the worker perceives that his wage is
affected by his pension. Although it is true that (3) must hold for all
workers, it is not necessary that the worker's wage respond directly to his
own pension level. For example, a wage could be "fixed," and the worker could
be allowed to choose his pension by altering H, but these actions would not
affect W as he perceives it. Although it is true that for all workers (3)—6—
musthold, any one worker's effect on W may be regarded as trivial or zero.
First, consider the opposite situation, where the worker recognizes that
any increase in P that is not accompanied by a corresponding increase in
productivity must result in a lower wage. (This would be true in a one—worker
firm.) The result is that the provisions of the pension plan cannot affect
behavior. There is never a deviation from first—best efficiency. The reason
is that the worker internalizes the full extent of his actions, no matter how
inefficient the pension formula may appear. This is trivial to show formally:











(4ii) -= V+K -- +-- L'(H) =0
or V+K=L'(H)
Equations (4i, 4ii) are identical to (ii, lii) so the worker chooses (H, K)
so as to guarantee first best efficiency, irrespective of the pension benefit
formula-. ny action: that-the worker takes that affects his pension also
affects his wage in the opposite direction and by a corresponding amount. If
the worker is fully aware of this, then all pension changes are offset and—7—
internalized, no matter how bizarre the pension formula. It is the
recognition by the worker that things must add up on the firm side of the
problem that forces himtobehave efficiently.
There is another way to state the same proposition: Distortions caused by
the pension can always be undone by a judiciously chosen wage function. As
long as
W(K, H)V +K—P(K,H)/H for all K, H
the worker's behavior cannot be affected by the pension. Whatever effect K
and H have to increase P is exactly offset by a reduction in W( ). As
long as the worker understands this relationship, pension effects wash out.
Then how can pension formulas affect behavior? In a multi—worker firm,
it may well be the case that the individual's wage is not a direct function of
his own pension benefits, even though all must add up across workers. This
has nothing to do with worker heterogeneity, but is the result of an
externality that is produced by separating the wage determination process from
the pension determination process at the level of the individual worker. Two
points are worth noting: First, there is no obvious reason why the firm
doesn't make the worker explicitly aware of the true relationship between P
and W. This is explored below. Second, a difference between the defined
benefit and defined contribution plans may be that the latter makes explicit
the relationship between P and W whereas the former does not. This is
also discussed below.
Those points aside, consider the worker's problem when W is set so
*** ** thatin equilibrium P/H =V+ K -P(H,K)/Hwhere H ,Kare the result
of the worker's maximization problem, which takes 71 as constant. This
insures zero profits, but the worker does not take that condition into account
in choosing H, K. For most of what follows, it is useful to recognize that—8—
pension benefit formulas rarely4 directly depend upon K, but instead depend
upon K indirectly through W. Therefore let P =P(W,H) for the
remainder. Further, suppose for simplicity that W is independent of H. If
workers take P/H as given, then the worker's maximization problem is




The first—order conditions are:
a ap (5i) -= H+-- — C'(K) =0
(5ii) -= v+x—(P/H)+- - L'(H) =0
The difference between (5i, 5ii) and (4i, 4ii) is that in (4), the
individual recognizes that increases in P are offset by decreases in W. In
(5), W is unaffected, as far as the individual worker is concerned, by
changes in P.
Even if the worker does not take into account the effect of pension on
wage, it is not necessarily the case that pensions result in an inefficient
allocation of effort, human capital, turnover, and leisure. This is easily
seen by examining the maximization prob1 in (2). In order for efficient
outcomes to result, it is sufficient that (2i) reduce to (ii) and (2ii) to
(2i). The first condition is met iff
aw (6a) -= H(1—
andthe second condition is met if f
(6b)—9—
Anypension—wagerelationship that the worker perceives as satisfying
(6a) and (6b) induces an efficient allocation of resources.
When the worker internalizes the firm's side of the problem, he knows




sothat (6a) is satisfied and
3W -= V+K-W-
sothat (6b) holds. Thus, internalization of (3) results in full efficiency.
Some Implications
Pattern Plans:
Although complete internalization is sufficient for efficiency, it is not
necessary. The standard defined benefit pattern plan, where the pension
depends only upon years of service and not salary, induces an efficient
allocation of resources. That pension takes the form
P =
where8isa fixed dollar amount and H is chosen by the worker. Under
those circumstances, and retaining the assumption that W =V+K—Wii,
3W/3K=1and 3P/3K=0so that (2i) becomes
(7i) H —C'(K)=0
Also, 3W/3H =0and 3P/3H =8 so(2ii) becomes—10—





Thus,(7i) and (7ii) are identical to (ii, lii) so efficiency is achieved.
Stated alternatively, since -= 0and -= 1,(6a) holds. Also,
3w
since -s--= -— = 0,and w =v+K—, (6b)reduces to 8= 8 and
holds as well.
This yields the conclusion that all standard pattern plans are efficient.
The reason is that even though the worker does not explicitly take into
account that his wage is reduced by an amount corresponding to pension size,
he does implicitly. Since the increase in pension value is a function only of
time worked, as is earnings, all is implicitly internalized. The worker's




= V+K-8/ - 8
sothe worker's true wage, as he sees it, is equaltohis value to the firm.
Thus,all is efficient.
Conventional Plans:
The conventional defined benefit plan, where the pension benefit depends
uponsome salaryaverage times a factor times years worked does not result in—11—
an efficient allocation of resources if the worker does not take (3) into
account explicitly. This can easily be shown:





p p aw -5:=-
since
W =V+K-P/H
(The worker takes P/H as given at
Thus, -= H,butW/ K =1so
(6a) is violated. However, aP/aH =
- = 0andW= Kbecause P/H
Thus, (2i) does not become (ii)






P/H and W is independent of H).
H H(1 —w/3K)unless y =0
'yW and V+K-W-H(W/H)='yw
=yW. Thus,(6b) holds.
even though (2ii) does become (lii)




If the conventional plan results in inefficient effort and labor supply,
which way do the effects go? The answer can be easily seen in Figure 1.
First—order conditions (ii) and (lii) are shown by the solid lines, and (Bi)
is shown by the dotted line. (Recall that (8ii) is identical to (ii).)
Point Q is the s6lution to (ii, lii) and also to (7i, 7ii) corresponding to
the pattern plan since pattern plans are efficient. Point R is the solution
to (8i, 8ii). Since y > 0, the line corresponding to (Si) must lie below
that to (ii) which implies that Hc >H*and that Kc > K*. There is too
much investment in human capital and effort, and too much labor supply with
too little turnover.
Thus, the simplest form of pattern plan provides incentives for an
efficient allocation of resources, whereas the standard conventional plan does
not. This suggests that conventional plans will also carry other provisions
that seek to undo the inefficiencies inherent in these plans. Hours
constraints, maximum and minimum numbers of years of service, and other
restrictions can be imposed to restore some of the lost efficiency and these
are explored in a later section.
It is interesting to perform some comparitive statics to predict when
inefficiencies will be most pronounced.
The most obvious relationship is that inefficiency is increased the
larger is .Sincethe current specification of the conventional plan is a
one—parameter one, this simply says that the inefficiency is increased the
larger is the pension for any given number of hours worked and wage level.
This is hardly surprising since if y were zero, there would be no pension
and no inefficiency. Given the shapes of the functions, however, an increase
in y causes more inefficiency increase in K than it does in H.6—13—
The inefficiency is greater when the value of raw labor, V,is large.
Mechanically, this is because the K =L'(H)—Vfunction shifts to the
northwest. Intuitively, it is because the higher is V1 the larger is the
number of hours worked, even when all is efficient. Thus, the absolute size
of the inefficiency increases with V. This is more than a neutral change in
units, however, because the C(K) function is not permitted to change simul-
taneously.
Contrast this with the effect of a steepening of the cost function
described by an increase in C' (K) at every K. This has the interpretation
of an increase in the disutility of effort or an increase in the cost of
improving skills. The effect is similar to a decrease in y.It reduces the
size of the inefficiency, and does so to a greater extent for K (effort and
human capital) than for H. The intuition here seems straightforward.
Steepening the cost function dampens the inefficiency effect because it makes
it more costly to behave in an opportunistic fashion.
The story is analogous for the disutility of hours worked function. An
increase in L' (H) for all H flattens the K function and results in a
reduction in both K and H. The reduction, however, is proportional so that
only the absolute size of the inefficiency decreases.
An obvious question is, "why are conventional plans widespread if they
introduce inefficiency?" There are a few possibilities:
First, everything said has been in terms of real wages, rather than
nominal ones. A conventional plan that bases the pension on the final few
years' salary indexes benefits to inflation. But even in an inflationary
environment, the same potential for distortion of too large H and K
exists. Further, pattern plans are often indexed to inflation, although
usually on an ad hoc basis. All that is necessary is that ,thedollar-14—
amountperyear of service, be adjusted to the CPI or other easily obtainable
index.
There are other possibilities. It has been assumed throughout that the
wage takes the form
W =V+K-P/H
As mentioned at the outset, it is always possible to undo the distortion
introduced by the pension by changing the wage function in a corresponding
fashion. But in this case the way by which the wage function changes to
restore optimality is of particular interest because it implies a direct
relationship between wages, human capital, and the pension formula.
It turns out that the efficient wage function that also guarantees zero
profit is
w =(, + K)









Sinceboth (6a) and (Gb) are true, efficiency is guaranteed. Further, since
W +P/H=W(1+y)—15—
and since w = + K), W + P/H =V+ K so zero profits are
guaranteed.
Thus, w = + K) is the efficiency inducing wage to couple with
conventional defined benefit plans. This is a specific example of the earlier
statement that setting
W V + K -P(W,H)/H
always insures efficiency. In this case, that identity holds when
W E + K).




w = + K)
for a conventional plan so that, other things equal,wagesshould rise more
rapidly with K for pattern plan workers than for conventional plan
workers. As a corollary, conventional plans with large values ofy should
reward effort and human capital less well.
These implications are somewhat difficult to test because K is not
easily observed. However, since K reflects human capital investment as well
as effort, one possibility is to examine the effect of schooling and experi-
ence on wages. If wages and pensions are set to induce efficiency, then
workers on jobs with conventional plans with high 's should have the lowest
effect of schooling and experience on earnings. This will be tested in
subsequent work.—16—
Again, no rationale for setting up conventional, as opposed to pattern,
plans is built into the analysis. The obvious explanation is that making the
pension a function of salary allows one formula to be used for many different
worker types. But most companies distinguish between worker types anyway,
assigning conventional plans to white collar workers and pattern plans to blue
collar workers. Many make finer distinctions. Tying pension to wage in order
to conserve on paper seems to be a weak explanation.
The argwnent that pensions are linked to wages for incentive reasons is
not correct. There are two related reasons: First, the wage itself is
sufficient to provide the appropriate incentives. Second, too much incentive
is generated by tying pension to wage. That was the first result of this
section. More subtle explanations are required.
Defined Contribution Plans:
What has been shown so far is that conventional defined benefit plans
result in inefficiencies when the worker's wage is not adjusted to his own
pension receipt. With defined contribution plans, what the worker receives is
equal (in an actuarial sense) to what he contributes. Thus,definedcontribu-
tion plans cannot introduce inefficiencies, irrespective of their provisions.
This is simply a trivial restatement of the proposition that if the worker
takes into account that his wage offsets any pension benefits received, he
will always internalize the full effects of the pension and behave efficient-
ly. Writing this down rigorously, note that with the defined contribution
pension plan, the contribution per period of time, G(W, H), times the length
of working life, H, must equal the received pension benefit, P(W, H).
In the absence of pensions, the wage must be set equal to V + K in
order to achieve efficiency. This follows directly from necessary condition—17—
(6b) because in the absence of a pension, P/H =0.
Thus, start by setting W =V÷ K and then introduce a defined contri-
bution plan that taxes G(W, H) per H worked. The worker's problem is then
(9) Max H(W -G(W,H)) +P(W,H) —C(K)—L(H)






This is identical to (1) so that efficiency is guaranteed. The first—order
conditions are
a aw
(9i) -= - H-C'(K) =0
(9ii) =W—L'(H) =0
Since aW/aK =1,(9i) reduces to (ii). Further since P =[G(W,HflH, W =
V+Kfrom (3). Since P/H =G(9ii) reduces to (lii).
Thus, defined contribution plans are always efficient without any
required additional constraints. This suggests the implication that defined
contribution plans should be more prevalent in situations where the inef-
ficiencies associated with the conventional defined contribution plan are most
pronounced. Using the comparative statics results generated above, defined
contribution plans should be used over conventional plans when pensions are
relatively large (rcausesgreater inefficiency), when investment in human
capital is high (C(K) function is flat) and when hours worked are large
(L(H) function is flat). This suggests the use of defined contribution plans
for high wage, highly skilled workers.7—18—
Vesting
In order to consider the effects of vesting, it is necessary to allow for
some workers to leave before the vesting date and others to stay beyond that
date. The easiest way to do this is to allow for two types of individuals:
the first type has alternative use of time function L(H) and the second has
alternative use of time function L(H) such that L(H) >L(H)for all H.
Let A of the population be of the first type and (1 —A)be of the second
type.
A full and immediate vesting pension of the pattern plan type is always
efficient. This simply requires duplication of the analysis on pp. 9 and 10
above for the two types of workers because implicit in that analysis was the
assumption that pensions vest immediately. The first-order conditions of the
worker's maximization problem are
H =C'(K)
V +K-8 + 8 = L'(H)
for the first type, and
=C'(K)
V +K-3 + 3 = L'(H)
for the second type.
Now consider the same pattern plans without vesting. The simplest form
of nonvesting is to assume that 3= 0if H < H. There are three cases:
First, H < H and H < H. This is the same as no pension since P/H =0
and so there is full efficiency. Second, H > H and H > H. This is the
case just analyzed as fully vested pension benefits and it yields efficiency
as well. The only interesting case arises when H < H, H > H or when
H > H, H < H.—19—
The important feature is that there is subsidization of the stayers by
the leavers and this causes a distortion. The wage paid to workers must be
sufficiently low to cover the pension costs to A of the population who are





















MaxH[V+IZ - ( )J -C(K)-L(H)
(10') A +(1—X)
since H < H so pension =0.The first—order conditions are







The situation is shown in Figure 2.
Points Q and Q are the efficient points for movers and stayers,
respectively, and are obtained in the absence of a pension. Note that H > H
and K > K because L' (H) < L' (H) for all H.
In the presence of the pension that does not vest immediately, (lOti) and
(1O'i) are identical to (lOi), but (1O'ii) and (1O'ii) shift as shown in
Figure 2. Thus, the new equilibrium points are R and R for movers and
stayers.
The most important result is that both H and K deviate from the
efficient levels. Stayers spend too much time on the job and invest in too
much human capital and effort because the marginal return to a year worked,
—A) V+K+ -
A+ (1—A)
exceeds the true value of work, V + K. Similarly, leavers leave too early
and do not invest in enough human capital and effort because the marginal




is less than the true value of work, V + K.
A few additional points are in order. First, average tenure in the
economy may rise or fall with the addition of an imperfect vesting provision.
Although average tenure rises for those who eventually receive a pension,
average tenure falls for those who do not. The effect on the average for the
economy as a whole depends upon the proportion of people in each group and
upontheincrease and decrease for the respective groups, which depends in
turn upon the slopes of L(H) and L(H). But it is indeed quite possible
that average tenure falls as the result of vesting.—21—
Second, although it has not been the approach of this analysis to
determine why or whether particular provisions exist in long run equilibrium,
ignoring those issues is particularly bothersome here. In particular, since
leavers subsidize stayers, one would expect some firms to cater only to
leavers, offering no pension and paying wage W =V+K.This type of self—
sorting, akin to Salop and Salop (1976), causes the non—fully vested pension
equilibrium to become efficient. The reason is that firms that offer pensions
obtain only stayers: Thus A =1and (1O'ii) become identical with (lOu).8
A sorting equilibrium is not established if workers do not know to which
class they belong before joining the firm. Of course, as is the case with any
of these apparent distortions, a firm that offered compensation that induced
efficiency could provide higher average wealth to the workers and should
attract the entire labor force. So full and immediate vesting should
dominate. But if L(H) is positively sloped, then some specificity to the
firm-worker relationship is implied. Sorting is particularly important when
there exist substantial hiring costs or large amounts of firm—specific
capital. Still, there is no obvious reason why a pension is used instead of
deferred compensation that takes the form of steeply rising tenure—earnings
profiles.
These deeper issues aside, the point is that plans that do not vest
immediately introduce distortions. Thus, other things constant, fully-vested
plans are more efficient, which implies that plans should be organized at the
industry, or better national level to eliminate such distortions. The fact
that they are not suggests that some other issue, and the sorting of workers
is a logical candidate, raises important problems with which labor markets
must grapple.—22—
The analysis for conventional plans is similar, has the same implica-
tions, and is not repeated here.
Minimum Benefit Levels
A number of plans have minimum benefit levels, below which pension
payments are not permitted to fall. These provisions are almost exclusively a
characteristic of conventional defined benefit plans. It might be thought
that this lump sum feature of the plan is a way by which the inefficiency
associated with conventional plans is eliminated. This is not the case.
A conventional plan with a minimum level of benefits takes the form
PySH for P>P
=P otherwise
Efficiency requires that (6a) and (6b) hold. When P < P, then (6a) holds
because =0.But (6b) is violated because -= 0and P > 0 implies
that W < V +K.
If the equilibrium were such that P > I', then (6a) implies that
=H(1-1)
=0.
This can only hold if y =0,i.e., if there is no pension so efficiency is
not achieved here either. Therefore, the addition of a minimum benefit level
cannot restore efficiency.
Minimum and Maximum Years of Service
for Pension Accrual
Some plans have minimum service requirements. Pension benefits do not




















The result is that if the equilibrium level of hours, H, exceeds H
then there is too little K and H relative to the efficient amount. If H
H < H, then there is too much K, H. If H < H, then all is efficient.
Theanalysisis most straightforward for pattern or flat benefit plans.
Here, (2i) remains as in the efficient case (ii), H-C'(K)=0,but (2ii)
becomes
K=L'(H) —V for H<H
BH
K=L'(H) -V- forH < H < H
(c) K =L'(H)—v+
H





Some plans have both. This section examines the










Again a graph helps to understand the solution. Qdenotesthe efficient
point in Figure 3.
If H < H, then the constraint is binding for all workers and no one
receives pensions. The marginal value of hours in the creation of pension
benefits and the average cost of pension benefits is zero so this reverts to
the no pension case and all is efficient.
If the relationships are such that the equilibrium has H < H < H, then
the relevant function is K =L'(H) -V-8H/Hand the equilibrium is at F1.
Here, K1 > K*, and H1 > H*, so there is too much effort, human capital,
and labor supplied. The reason is that when H > H > H, the marginal return
to an additional year worked in increasing the pension is .Butthe cost of
the pension earned for only H —Hyears is spread over all years H so that
wage is reduced by less than the marginal value of pension benefits. Thus,
the net value of an additional hour worked is positive so workers overachieve,
and over—achievement depends directly upon the level of H. The larger is
H, subject to H > H, the larger is the inefficiency.
The reverse is true when H > H. Then the marginal pension value of an
additional year of work is zero, but the cost of previous accruals is spread
over all years so that W is reduced without an offsetting marginal benefit.
Thus, workers under—achieve. This is shown at F2 with H2 <H* and
K2 < K.
The analysis for conventional plans is similar, but slightly more
complicated. Here, (2i) is altered as well, depending upon the regime, since
P/W is not generally equal to zero. Instead,—25—
(2i&) H =C'(K) for H < H
(b') H =[C'(K)+yH]/(1+1) for H < H < H
(c') H=C'(K) for H>H.
Similarly, (2ii) becomes:
(2iia') K =L'(H) -V for H < H
Iw
(b') K =L'(H)-V-




for H > H
Figures 4 and 5 graph the possibilities.
Figure 4 illustrates the cases where H < H and H < H < H. Efficiency
is shown at Q. If is sufficiently high so that H < ,thenQ is
the equilibrium arid all is efficient. No one works long enough to receive a
pension so it drops out completely and all is efficient.
If H1 is sufficiently low so that H < H < H in equilibrium, then the
relevant conditions are (2ib') and (2iib'). Equation (2ib') is shown. But
since w is a function of H, the exact shape of (2iib') is unknown. Still,
it is clear that (2iib') lies to the northwest of K =L'(H)—V.Point C
* * denotesthe solution to the standard conventional plan with H > H ,K> K
The solution with H> 0 occurs at D. D can lie almost anywhere with
respect to Q and C, so nothing can be said about the efficiency of D
* * relativeto C. But it is clear that at D, H > Hand K > x so the
inefficiency is never eliminated. In the case of pattern plans, larger
deviations of H from zero make things worse for both H and K relative to
the efficient values. This suggests the following empirical proposition:
minimum years of service constraints should never be a feature of pattern—26—
plans, but sometimes will make things better in a conventional plan and there-
fore maybepart of conventional plans.
* Finally,in Figure 5, if H > H then it must be the case that H < H
*
K< Kbecause the equilibrium, E, must lie to the southwest of the
efficient point (since (2iic1) lies below K =L'(H)—V).However, whether
this is an improvement upon the conventional plan solution at F is ambigu-
ous. It is clear that it reduces K and H, but by too much. This implies
that too little investment, effort and work occur because the marginal
incentives are too low as in the flat case. Further, the inefficiency
worsens, the larger is H -Hso that the existence of a maximum years of
service constraint, when binding, should be coupled with minimum years of
service constraints.
Constraints on Work Time and Effort
Suppose that "all—or—nothing" contracts could be offered to workers. The
general rule is that these contracts can always be made efficient because they
remove all chance of opportunistic behavior by the worker. In this context,
* * thiswould amount to a contract that specified H =H,K=Kand some lump
sum payment. Ignoring costs of monitoring and enforcement, it is useful to
ask whether, when and what kind of constraints are desirable. In particular,
it is interesting to consider when fixing H or K alone is sufficient to
bring about efficiency.
A general statement follows from examination of (2). Equation (2i)
reduces to (ii) (efficiency) iff (6a) holds. So when (6a) holds, even if (6b)
* isviolated, fixing H =Hwill result in full efficiency. The reason is
that then the worker maximizes only with respect to K and the solution to
* * (2i),given H =His K =K•Thereverse is true if (Gb) holds and (Ga)—27—
*
doesnot. Then setting K =Keliminates (2i) as a first—order condition
* * andthe solution to (2ii), given K K ,isH
Equations (6a) and (6b) always hold for pattern plans. Therefore, there
should be no constraints on years of service or investment and effort with
pattern plans. One might then argue that mandatory retirement should be less
prevalent for workers with pattern plans than for conventional plans. This is
not a direct implication, however, because mandatory retirement refers to age
rather than to years of service.
Conventional plans satisfy (6b) but violate (6a). This implies that only
constraints on K (and not H) are required to bring about efficiency. Thus
skill levels and effort levels are to be precisely specified for conventional
plan workers. As the result, piece rate workers who are allowed to select
their effort levels, should not have defined benefit conventional plans.
Extensions of the Model and Additional Issues
Multiple Wage Rates
So far, wages have been constant over the lifetime. One question is, how
does generalization to multiperiods with different wage rates in each affect
the results? Specifically, in a two-period context, the pension can be paid
for out of the wages from either period, or from some combination of the
two. The result is that no matter how it is done, as long as the worker
recognizes that his wages depend upon the pension through the zero profit
constraint, or is forced to recognize it by an appropriate shift in the wage
function, all is internalized and no inefficiency results. Tilting the age—
earnings profile has no effect on behavior. This is easily seen. The
worker's problem is now—28—
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First—order conditions are:








a aP ap ap =v+i -O—
-(1-8) +- = 0
1 1 1 1 1 (1 lii)
= V+K- = 0
H1
a aP a aP aL =V+K -O-—
-(1 - 0) — +- = 0
2 2 2 2 2
(1liii)
=V+K - - 0
Equations (lii),(liii), (lliii) arethe two—period analogue of (ii) andbring
about efficiency. Thus, independent of the division of pension costs, i.e.,
for any0,as long as the worker is aware of the competitive firm's response
to his pension increase, all is internalized and efficient.
This does not imply that pensions never distort incentives. If the
worker's ownwagedoes not adjust to his ownpension,but rather to the
average pension on which he has only a trivial effect, then inefficiencies can
resultas they do in the one—period case. More fundamentally, if the "true"
wage, including the value of pension accrual and other perks. does not equal
marginal product, and if the worker is allowed to choose his hours, then
inefficiencies result. But this point, which is analyzed in more detail in—29—
Lazear [1981], is quite independent of pensions and holds even when all
compensation takes the form of a direct money wage.
Corner Solutions:
It is useful to consider some special cases. First, consider the case
where the H function, (2i), and the K function, (2ii), do not intersect in
the positive quadrant. This can happen either because the L'(H) function is
too flat, reflecting a very low utility loss associated with foregone addi-
tional hours of leisure, or because the Ct(K) function is too flat,
reflecting a very low marginal cost of effort or investment. Under such
circumstances, time worked, effort and human capital investment are infinite.
It is clear that such a situation cannot occur if for no other reason than
that the L(H) function becomes vertical (horizontal in the diagrams) when
time worked reaches length of life.
Second, it is possible that the L(H) function is perfectly inelastic at
H =0.This means that the worker views work at this firm as so distasteful
that he is unwilling to supply even one hour at any price. Then the inter-
section is at the origin, yielding the corner solution that H =0and K =0.
Third, the worker may view all jobs as identical, in which case the L(H)
function is perfectly elastic at L(H) equal to the marketwage. This makes
the K function a vertical line at (market wage —V).If this lies in the
positive quadrant, then equilibrium is at the interior intersection, because
the worker's value to this firm is sufficient to bid himaway from rivals. In
the case where that vertical line lies to the left of the vertical axis, no
work occurs, because the worker's marginal product, V1 at this firm is in-
sufficient to warrant employment given the market price of his services. If
that line is coincident with the vertical axis, then all are indifferent—30—
because his marginal product here is identical to the market wage so neither
the worker nor firm has a preference over his work location.
Finally, if C' (K)is positive for K =0then a corner solution exists
if L' (H)is sufficiently steep (flat K function in the diagram) to avoid
an intersection in the positive quadrant. The interpretation is that the
fixed cost of effort or investment is sufficiently high to discourage any work
at this job. The solution is H =0,K =0.
Incidentally, when comparing the solution, K has the interpretation of
effort or human capital specific to this firm. Obviously, if a corner
solution is reached because, say, V is too low relative to the market wage,
investment in human capital and effort at the other firm is still possible.
Maximum Age 1estrictions:
A number of plans have a maximum age of starting employment such that
workers who start after that age are not entitled to enrollment in the pension
plan. This is quite aside from any issues of vesting which depends upon years
of service, independent of age. Although no solid explanation of this
phenomenon is presented, it is useful to consider the issues.
The fact that firms do not want to put old workers of a given tenure
together with young workers of given tenure, suggests that old workers cost
more in terms of pension payouts even holding years of service constant. The
most obvious reason why this is the case is that a worker who starts at age 59
is likely to retire with fewer years of service than a worker who starts at,
say, age 45. If defined benefit plans were set up in a way that subsidized
retirees with fewer years of service, then it would be more costly to enroll
older workers in a pension plan than younger workers. Elsewhere [Lazear 1982,
1983], I have argued that it is efficient to set up pension plans the actuar-—31—
ial value of which declines with increasedyears of service because of
incentive and turnover effects. I also find empiricalsupport for this propo-
sition. This story seems to provide an explanation forage restrictions, but
there remains the queston, why aren't plans madeage— as well as experience—
dependent? Such a provision would probably be illegal under theAge
Discrimination in Employment Act, but this is arelatively recent constraint
and it is not clear why it does not apply to theprovision that denies
pensions to older new hires.
Individualized Wage-Pension Combinations:
The basic result, that pensions cannot affect behavior if thecorres-
ponding wage adjustments are accounted for by the worker, leads to an obvious
question: Is the wage set independent of the pension, and ifso, why? Why
doesn'tthe firmcallout a wage-pension combination such that W =V+K-
P(H,K)/H so that the worker is forced to internalize everything andtobehave
efficiently?
The obvious answer is almost definitional. To do so makes thepension
identical to wage payments and the pension might as well be eliminated
altogether. The fact that wages and pensions are somewhat independent
provides some clue as to why there are pensions in the first place.
If pensions are part of an optimal compensation scheme thatattempts to
deal with problems of incentives and turnover (asargued in Lazear 11982]),
then a pension that is independent of thewage for the individual worker
provides the extra degree of freedcn necessary to restore efficiency.Simply
offering a higher wage does not provide the appropriate incentives because of
the contingent nature of pensions on performance. Pension"buyouts" of rela-
tively less productive workers are part of the optimal compensation scheme.—32—
The same is true if the pension functions as an insurance device, paying
more to workers who live longer (or who live to the same age but retire
earlier). Reducing the pension while at the same time increasing the wage
defeats the usefulness of the pension as an insurance device. Allowing the
worker to choose his wage—pension allocation results in the standard adverse
selection problem and separating equilibrium issues discussed by Akerlov
[1970] and Rothschild and Stiglitz [1976].
The exception to this is the rationalization of pensions as a tax—free
savings account.9 If it were performing only this function, then allowing the
worker to choose the combination of wage with pension would in no way negate
the tax saving effects of a pension and would allow the individual to tailor
the compensation to his individual situation. As the result, no rationali-
zation of independent wage—pension provisions is provided by the tax argument.
Further, if taxes were the issue, a defined contribution plan would win on
almost every count. Yet defined benefit plans are prevalent.
Plans That 2re Not Actuarially Fair:
All of the analysis is conducted under the simplifying assumption that
P(H, K) is some fixed payment rather than some annual flow, which more
closely describes most pensions. If risk neutrality is assumed, the fact that
some workers may receive less than P while others receive more than P is
not essential. What is essential is that the interpretation of a pattern plan
as one that has P depend upon years of service in a linear fashion and a
conventional plan as one that depends upon some salary average and years of
service in a linear fashion is not accurate. Aside from explicit nonlinear—
ities built into the benefit formulas, there are implicit nonlinearities which
have to do with when the worker retires.—33—
For example, in the pattern plan, it is the annual flow of pension
benefits, not the expected present value of those benefits that increases at
constant rate per year of service. In order for this to cause the present
value of pension benefits to increase at a constant rate per year of service
additional restrictions having to do with life expectancy, discount factors
and rate of accrual are required. In reality, I have shown that the contrary
is generally the case (Lazear [1982, 1983)). Beyond a certain number ofyears
of service, the present value of pension benefits actually declines withyears
of service. A similar statement is true for conventional plans of the defined
benefit type as well.
In fact, in the case of conventional plans, the reduction in present
value with years of service beyond a certain point may help to restore the
efficiency that is lost when workers fail to account appropriately for the
relationship between wages and pensions. Since, in the absence of a decline,
workers tend to overinvest in human capital, to work too hard, and to put in
too many hours and years of service, this decline may actually move the
situation toward the first-best solution.
Finally, it has been assumed throughout that the wage never exceeds the
workerts marginal product. If it does, as I have suggested elsewhere, then
seemingly inefficient pensions may actually bring about efficiency.
Conclusion:
This paper creates as many questions as answers. The goal is to identify
the incentive effects of different pension provisions. In doing so, puzzles
arise because many provisions appear to have adverse incentive effects.
Although few of the puzzles are solved, some directions for empirical
investigation are suggested. In particular, the link between the wage—34—
relationship and productivity variables bears a special correspondence to the
pension plan. For example, one implication is that pattern plans should be
coupled with wage functions that reward increased effort more generously than
those coupled with conventional plans. Further, the incidence of maximum and
minimum hours restrictions in pension plans is predicted, as well as the
pattern of hours and effort requirements.
Perhaps more important than the empirical implications of the model is
the clarifications of the effects induced by various pension provisions. Many
of the effects are subtle in mechanism, although not necessarily in size. Few
have been considered in the past and this essay takes a first step toward the
understanding of these institutions that often seem either innocuous or
arbitrary to the casual observer.—35—
FOOTNOTES
*
Helpfulcomments by Jerry Hausman, Herman Leonard, Barry Nalebuff, and
Sherwin Rosen are gratefully acknowledged.
Blinder, Gordon and Wise (1978), Burkhauser andQuinn (1981), and Fields
and Mitchell (1981) examine the effects on retirement behavior.Stiglitz
(1982) considers vesting effects as well.
2For example, investment in humancapital may be more easily observed
than changes in the level of effort, because the formermay require the use of
the firm's resources (e.g., other employees as teachers,..
3Forexample, some emphasize tax breaks enjoyed (Black [1980], Tepper
[1981], Merton [1982], Sharpe [1976], Bu1ow [1979, 1981] while others
emphasize incentive and mobility effects (Miller and Scholes [1981], Lazear
[1979, 1982, 1983])
4me exception is thesplit in benefit formula between white and blue
collar workers.
5mis is a special case becauseW(K) =V+K—P/Himplies that W'(K)
=1.Additional distortions and offsets can be introduced by choosing other
W(K) functions. But unless the general condition that W(K, H)V +K—P(K,H)/H
holds, the deviation from first best remains. Only then can the firm break
even and have conditions (2i) and (2ii) reduce to (ii) and (lii).
61n order to achieve an interiorsolution, it must be the case that the
K function is flatter than the H function, or that thedisutility of labor
hours (i.e., the value of leisure) rises more rapidly than the cost of
additional human capital or effort. Suppose it did not. Then the solution
would be to continue to invest in K and keep working more andmore hours.
Eventually, H approaches maximum feasible hours, so L'(H) must become—36—
infinite, guaranteeing an interior solution.
7This ignores differences that result from consideration of thereasons
for pensions in the first place. This set of predictions is most consistent
with the view that a pension serves as a tax—free savings account, but
neglects any explanation for pensions having to do with incentives or
separation efficiency.
8hsch explores this mechanism both at the theoretical level and
empirically.
9See Miller and Scholes (1982), Bulow (1979, 1981), Black (1980),Pepper
(1981), Sharpe (1976), Merton (1982) for discussions.—37—
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K=L'(H) -V+1 (H-H) /H
K